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1 Introduction
Dating back as early as the 19th century, formal establishment of Employment Guaran-
tee Schemes (EGS) has been a staple of relief policies in response to natural disasters
and economic downturns worldwide. Contemporary schemes in many developed and
developing countries have evolved to encompass a broad array of objectives: providing
income relief by generating employment; constructing and maintaining public infrastruc-
ture; ameliorating endemic poverty; improving workers’ position to bargain in the private
sector and facilitating job search (Dre`ze and Sen 1991, Lipton 1998, von Braun 1995).
Some of the earliest examples include the 1817 Poor Employment Act and the
1834 Poor Law Amendment Act in Great Britain (Blaug 1963, 1964), the New Deal
programs of the 1930’s in the United States (Kesselman 1978, Bernstein 1970), and the
Employment Guarantee Act of 1978 in the State of Maharashtra in India (Maharash-
tra Planning Department 1979). In the developing countries of Latin America (Chile
1987), Asia (Pakistan 1992, Bangladesh 1983, Phillipines 1990), and Africa (Botswana
1960, Kenya 1992),1 a major objective of establishing employment guarantees has been
large scale poverty reduction. Meanwhile, many recent programs are notable particularly
for the specific limits they impose on reach and accessibility. For example, the Youth
Employment Guarantee Act of 1991 in the Netherlands and Egypt’s employment guaran-
tee program respectively aim at guaranteeing employment to young persons and college
graduates.2 Still other programs impose limits on access in spatial terms. Tanzania’s
Special Public Works Programs (1978) was instituted within village limits, with employ-
ment guarantee limited only to residents (Teklu 1995). The widely debated National
Rural Employment Guarantee Act of India (2005) is one of the most recent attempts to
provide statutory basis for a government guarantee of employment initially in 200 rural
districts.
This wealth of government initiatives notwithstanding, conceptual understanding
of the mechanics of employment guarantee schemes (EGS) in general, and the diﬀerence
that an oﬃcial commitment has on the private labor market in particular, has been in
short supply. In terms of mechanics, at the core of an EGS are three distinct features: (i)
an EGS wage in exchange for labor services, (ii) the ease of access to such employment,
and (iii) the degree of contestability that such a wage introduces into the labor market.
1See Dre`ze and Sen 1989, Lipton 1998, Keddeman 1998 and von Braun 1995.
2See ILO (2006) for the Netherlands, Assaad (1997) for Egypt, and also Dar and Tzannatos (1999)
for a number of OECD countries.
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These have each been discussed, though yet to be articulated and analysed as an unit.
First and foremost, oft-noted has been the promise of employment guarantees to alle-
viate poverty by delivering targeted transfers to the poor (Dre`ze and Sen 1991, Lipton
1998, von Braun 1995)3 with an accompanying empirical literature and case studies that
establish the size of such direct transfer benefits (Ravallion 1991, Ravallion, Datt and
Chaudhuri 1993). The EGS wage, when viewed in this light, is arguably akin to direct
transfers to the poor rooted firmly in the principles of self-selection subject to financing
constraints (Besley and Coate 1992, Besley and Kanbur 1993).
Second, while EGS has been touted as an employment oriented approach to anti-
poverty policy-making, or invoked as a countercyclical labor market policy to economic
downturns, such a guarantee alone has never implied universal elimination of unemploy-
ment. This suggests that another key metric by which the eﬀectiveness of EGS can be
gauged is the ease of access to such programs. Indeed, whereas a government may per-
fectly follow through with the letter of an employment guarantee legislation by paying a
predetermined EGS wage, discretion with respect to the ease of access to EGS employ-
ment can nevertheless be viewed as an implicit employment rationing device, which goes
against the original intention of the law.4
Lastly, employment guarantees have also been credited for their potential to in-
duce positive labor market responses by improving the bargaining strength of workers
(Dre`ze and Sen 1991, Dev 1995). The eﬃcacy of an EGS accordingly also depends on
the extent to which the introduction of such contestability matters. Naturally, this final
dimension of an EGS becomes relevant particularly in an imperfectly competitive labor
market, and should be expected to have no eﬃciency enhancing impact when a perfectly
competitive framework is the relevant starting point. What is important to note is that
in both rural and urban labor markets, there is evidence of market outcomes consistent
with imperfect competition and market power (Bardhan and Rudra 1978, Bardhan 1979,
1981, Binswanger et. al. 1984, Card and Krueger 1995, Datt 1997 and Manning 2005).
Once these three individual building blocks of an EGS are spelled out, the question
3Rural public works programs have been studied in a number of important contexts: (i) providing
income insurance and impacting seasonal agrarian labor markets (A. Basu 2005), (ii) building longer
term capital assets (K. Basu 1991), (iii) obviating the need for the dislocation of families in search of
jobs and food (Dre`ze and Sen 1991), and (iv) impacting the flow of rural-urban migration when EGS is
location-specific (Ravallion 1990).
4The reduction in EGS employment subsequent to the EGS wage hike in Maharashtra is one such
case in point (Ravallion, Datt and Chaudhuri 1993, Dev 1995).
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of a need for an oﬃcial commitment to employment guarantees acquires added meaning.
The Indian National Rural Employment Guarantee Act of 2005 (NREGA), for example,
provides that unless otherwise changed by the Central Government,
“the minimum wage fixed by the State Government ... shall be considered as
the [EGS] wage rate applicable to that area.”
Further, the Act specifies 60 Indian rupees per day per person as the absolute minimum
EGS wage in any State.5 In terms of access, the Act further provides that
“As far as possible, employment shall be provided within a radius of 5 kilo-
metres of the village where the applicant resides at the time of applying”
leaving open to discretion therefore the ease of access facing workers who wish to participate.6
A legal employment guarantee may therefore either be (i) a complete contract,
which stipulates in full detail both the wage and access components of the act or (ii)
an incomplete contract, in which one or more of these components are left open to
discretion, and are impossible to fix a priori. Of particular interest, therefore, is how
the eﬀectiveness of an EGS in oﬀsetting labor market imperfections and in alleviating
poverty may be aﬀected by this inability / impossibility of full commitment. There are
thus two related sets of issues. The first concerns the labor market consequences of an
EGS in which the EGS wage and access are juxtaposed. The second concerns questions
of EGS policy formation and wage setting with and without commitment.
In order to evaluate these issues, we introduce a formal model of an EGS in the con-
text of a canonical model of the labor market in which a host of labor market structures,
ranging from monopsonistic, oligopsonistic, and all the way to the perfectly competitive
case, can be accommodated. As discussed, an EGS is characterized by the EGS wage,
and the accessibility of EGS employment expressed in terms of a cost of job search. Anal-
ogously, private employment opportunities are also characterized by a market determined
wage rate, and the associated cost of job search. In this setting, (i) aggregate productiv-
ity slowdowns, (ii) sector and worker specific costs of job search, and (iii) oligopsonistic
5See Subbarao (1997) for a tabulation of the EGS wages applied in various employment programs in
developing countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, Phillipines, Botswana and Chile.
6The Indian National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) of 2005 contains additional and
discretionary terms that can similarly impact access, including for example the provision of child care
services for female workers. Indeed, Bhatty (2006) reports the success of the NREGA from an em-
ployment and registration standpoint in Dungarpur, Rajasthan, but simultaneously a lack of child care
facilities at NREGA worksites. The report also notes the large scale involvement of female workers, and
the cost of this neglect in terms of the condition of children.
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market power are each potential contributors to the equilibrium size of the pool of un-
employed. This simple framework provides a number of insights into the positive and
normative aspects of an EGS.
1. A double-edged sword: An EGS embodies a policy mix. On one hand, it introduces
contestability in labor hiring, expected to raise employment in imperfectly competitive
labor markets. On the other hand, it also raises the reservation wage which reduces
private employment in the standard way regardless of labor market structure. All else
constant, the relationship between the EGS wage and private employment outcomes is
accordingly non-monotonic, for a given level of access. Likewise, the relationship be-
tween the accessbility of EGS employment and private employment outcomes is also
non-monotonic, for a given EGS wage.
2. Eﬃciency at no cost: Despite the complication that arises with non-monotonicity, a
unique EGS wage and access pairing that maximizes private employment can be found.
Interestingly, this maximum level of private employment corresponds to the perfectly
competitive labor market outcome. Thus, if a perfectly competitive labor market de-
scribes reality, an EGS at best leaves unchanged, but otherwise strictly decreases private
employment. Moving away from the competitive baseline, however, a private employ-
ment increasing EGS can always be found. Indeed, an EGS can costlessly replicate the
competitive labor market outcome, by exploiting to the fullest extent the contestability
faculty of the EGS.
3. Selection, global and local displacement: A key issue with workfare schemes
concerns selection, and the possibility that those who would otherwise be employed nev-
ertheless find the EGS to be preferable, and are selected out of the private labor market
simply because an EGS is put in place.7 The result is a displacement of workers from
private sector employment. Since labor market response is non-monotonic respectively
in the EGS wage and the ease of access, depending on whether the contestability eﬀect
or the reservation wage eﬀect takes on a dominating role, the question of selection is
made up of a local and a global component. Thus, evidence showing that a higher EGS
wage (and easier access to the EGS) displaces private employment provides insuﬃcient
proof that the EGS would not increase private employment relative to the no government
intervention benchmark.
7Batty (2006) reports examples of job switching subsequent to the NREGA in India.
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4. Aggregate employment targeting: At its core, an EGS can be thought of as
embodying an aggregate (private plus EGS) employment target. Fine-tuning the EGS
wage and access in turn provides an added degree of control and allows the right mix
of private and EGS employment to be designed into the scheme, given the target. If
eﬃciency improvement is the primary concern, the EGS wage should be set just high
enough to induce private employers to face competition from the EGS. In contrast, if
employment associated with a perfectly competitive labor market is deemed too low,
any EGS that reaches the aggregate employment target can trigger the reservation wage
eﬀect. Accordingly, the least private employment displacing EGS in this setting requires
the EGS wage to be set as low as possible, while the aggregate employment target is
reached by relaxing access.
Taken together, these observations shed light on a new dimension of EGS as a labor
market policy, and shift its longstanding focus from one which centers on poverty alle-
viation, to one which also emphasizes eﬃciency improvement in imperfectly competitive
labor markets. This new focus will need to be qualified, however, as we move from what
an EGS can accomplish in principle, to scenarios in which the credibility of the policy
announcements are in doubt. Two scenarios are taken up in turn, the first involving
legislation that fully commits the planner to both the wage and access dimenions of
an EGS, while the latter leaves the access component open to ex post discretion, a` la
Kydland and Prescott (1977) albeit in a diﬀerent context.
5. Commitment: With but one borderline exception, welfare maximization always in-
vokes an EGS, regardless of the productivity of public and private employment, and the
weight that a government attaches to poverty relative to eﬃciency. For planners exhibit-
ing no distributional concern, the EGS is set to target aggregate employment to replicate
a perfectly competitive labor market, at no cost to the government. Doing so requires a
high enough EGS wage to elicit a contestable labor market. For planners who are suf-
ficiently concerned about poverty, the EGS is set to target aggregate employment that
exceeds the competitive baseline. Achieving this in the least cost way requires private
employment displacement to be minimized. In sharp contrast to the planner concerned
only about eﬃciency, a planner who also cares about distribution needs to adopt an EGS
wage that is as close to the poverty line as possible.
6. Credibility Triggers: In the face of employers and workers that harbor rational
expectation, a government’s guarantee of employment will be deemed credible when the
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cost to the planner of actually hiring EGS workers is no higher than the perceived bene-
fits of doing so. We find that the credibility of any employment target set out by an EGS
can be triggered by three sets of factors. These include labor market triggers such as
low labor productivity and oligopsonistic market power; cost triggers such as the revenue
(costs) that can be generated from public works, and planners’ preference triggers such
as a high degree of poverty aversion.8
These observations are consistent with many of the historical circumstances un-
der which employment guarantees have been deployed: as a countercylical labor market
policy response to economic downturns and disasters, invoked when there are genuine
justifications for public works (such as the contruction of the autobahn in post war Ger-
many and the New Deal public works projects), and / or when there is a shift in political
power that provides essential support for policy reforms that alleviate poverty.
Even more interestingly, the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act abolished government
grants to supplement low wages, and embarked instead on the prinicple of “less eligibil-
ity” in Great Britain. At least in part, this may have been a response to the perceived
runaway budget consequences of the 1817 Poor Employment Act, along with the concern
that workers who would otherwise find employment in the private sector chose to seek
government assistance instead (Blaug 1963, 1964). In contrast, the EGS wage hike in the
State of Maharastra in India may have instigated the need to ration EGS employment
ex post (Dev 1995, Ravallion, Datt and Chaudhuri 1993, Gaiha 1996). Incidences of
EGS job rationing, either when wages or when the demand for work is too high have
also been noted for employment programs in Tanzania and Botswana (Subbarao 1997,
Teklu 1995). In relation to our findings, these important historical episodes illustrate
the possibility of subsequent surprises in EGS employment in either direction, whenever
the EGS wage is not set with the possibility of ex-post discretion with respect to access
in mind.
7. Choosing an EGS wage: In our setup, choosing an EGS wage can have real labor
market consequences, precisely since it leads employers and workers to the (rational)
expectation that access will be limited ex post. This makes the task of setting the EGS
wage at the “right” level nontrivial. We have three interesting sets of results, that are
in sharp contrast to the almost universal usefulness of an EGS with commitment.
8In a companion paper, Basu, Chau and Kanbur (2005) shows that the credibility of a (partially
enforced) minimum wage policy, instead of an EGS, is triggered in labor markets where private labor
productivity is suﬃciently high.
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First, if none of the credibility triggers applies, the question of choosing an EGS
wage does not even arise since there exists no predetermined EGS wage that can impact
private or public labor market outcomes.
At the other extreme, if the credibility triggers are important enough to justify a
higher than perfectly competitive level of aggregate employment, the EGS wage should
be as close to the poverty line as possble, with access expected to be extended to meet
the employment target. In this way, private employment displacement is minimized,
and endogenous selection of workers into the pool of EGS laborers, in as much as it is
feasible, favors those that face a relatively high cost of job search and are thus otherwise
left out of the labor market.
Finally, for credibility triggers that justify intermediate levels of employment be-
tween the no government intervention and the perfectly competitive benchmarks, an
EGS works purely as an announcement of contestability. Thus, we have an intriguing
instance here where the eﬀectiveness of the announcement of EGS in leading to eﬃciency
enhancing change in the labor market now depends critically, among other things, on
the distributional concern of the planner in question. In particular, the outcome for a
planner who cares only about eﬃciency could be less eﬃcient than the outcome for a
planner who cares about poverty as well.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the basic model of the
labor market is laid out. An EGS is introduced in Section 3, and its impact on private
and public sector employment are discussed. Sections 4 - 6 are devoted to workings
of an EGS with or without commitment, depending on the kind of objectives that an
EGS is expected to accomplish. Section 7 concludes and briefly touches on two useful
extensions.
2 The Private Labor Market
There are N = 1, ...,∞ exogenously given number of identical employers and a popula-
tion of heterogeneous workers with unit mass. For employers, the benefits and costs of
labor hiring are characterized respectively by a marginal (and average) value product of
labor, a > 0, and the wage cost per worker, w > 0.
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For workers, employment in the private labor market yields a wage benefit w, but at a
cost. The cost of job search is given by tx ≥ 0, and includes a worker-specific component,
x and a sector or industry-specific component, t. The worker-specific component para-
meterizes heterogeneity among workers in terms of their individual access to the private
labor market, which can be interpreted as the cost of job search. We assume that the
distribution of x among workers is uniform along the [0, 1] range.9
The sector or industry-specific job search component, t, gives the informational, loca-
tional and / or other skill-related costs required to secure a job from one of the N
employers.10 Employment in the private labor market generates a worker- and sector-
specific level of utility u(x, w) = w − tx. Every worker supplies inelastically one unit
of labor unless otherwise deterred by the cost of job search. Assuming without loss of
generality that the reservation utility of every worker is equal to zero, the implied inverse
private sector labor supply is given simply by: w(`) ≡ t`, for ` ≤ 1.
The N employers engage in non-cooperative competition for laborers: Each employer
i maximizes profits (a − t(`i + `−i))`i by choice of the desired number of laborers, `i,
taking as given the aggregate labor demand by the rest of the N − 1 employers, `−i.
Thus, ` ≡ `i + `−i. In a symmetric Nash equilibrium ((N − 1)`i = `−i), the marginal
value product of labor is equated with the perceived marginal labor cost schedule in the
usual way:
a = (1 + n)t`, n =
1
N
.
Aggregate private labor market outcome is thus a wage and employment pair {wo(n), `o(n)}
(Figure 1):
`o(n) =
a
t(1 + n)
, wo(n) =
a
1 + n
< a (1)
if a
[t(1+n)]
< 1. Otherwise, `o(n) = 1 and wo(n) = t. As should be expected, these
encompass a whole spectrum of labor market outcomes as special cases, ranging from
monopsonistic:
`o(1) =
a
2t
, wo(1) =
a
2
< a,
to perfectly competitive
lim
n→0
`o(n) =
a
t
≡ `o(0), lim
n→0
wo(n) = a ≡ wo(0),
9See Mitra (2006) for example, for evidence of the role of the cost of job search on employment and
job mobility in India, and more importantly, the hetergeneity of the cost of job search among workers.
10In the sequel, this industry-specific cost of job search (t) will be contrasted with the cost of securing
a public sector job made available via the EGS.
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if a
t
< 1, with the equilibrium wage given simply by the marginal value product.
Note that if a
t
< 1, that is, if the productivity of labor a is low enough and/or the
sector-specific cost of job search t is high enough, then regardless of the degree of market
power (n), there will be workers for whom search costs are high enough to keep them
out of private sector employment. We will refer to these workers as “the unemployed”.
These are all workers whose utility is at the normalized level of zero — lower than any
worker who has employment in the private sector.
3 Employment Guarantees
A principle objective of an EGS is to provide relief to those who are otherwise deterred
from joining the workforce because of search costs on the supply side, or a lack of demand
due either to low productivity or market power in equilibrium. Let `g be the number
of such EGS workers. The revenue equivalent of the services provided on a per worker
basis is denoted as ag. The revenue parameter ag can take on positive or negative values
depending on whether the gross amount of services provided by the scheme exceeds or
is less than the costs of administering the program. We assume that ag < a, in order
to rule out findings that by assumption call for the government to eﬀectively nationalize
the labor market.
For workers, EGS employment can be characterized by a wage and access pairing, wg
and tg ≡ t(1+τg) . Both wg and τg (and hence tg) are policy variables. wg gives the EGS
wage per worker, and 1 + τg ≡ ttg > 0 denotes the relative ease of securing public as
opposed to private employment.11
For EGS employment to oﬀer relief for those workers who cannot otherwise find private
employment, the EGS wage is assumed to be no less than an exogenously given income
threshold w¯g ≥ 0, that (weakly) exceeds the reservation utility at zero.12 We assume
that wo(n) > w¯g, and accordingly either EGS or private employment is synonymous
with achieving an income level above the exogenous threshold. The determination of
1 + τg > 0 should be thus thought of as part of the government’s decision to provide
job information to the pool of otherwise unemployed job seekers, to adjust the physical
11We will refer to EGS employment interchangeably with employment secured through the EGS, and
private employment interchangeably with employment with one of the N private employers.
12The special case of w¯g = 0 thus corresponds to a situation wherein an EGS in fact oﬀers no income
relief to any worker.
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location of employment openings and / or the skill-requirements associated with EGS
employment. In each case, an increase in τg improves access and lowers the cost of job
search tx
(1+τg)
.
3.1 Comparative Statics
Let `e and we denote employment and wage in the private sector in the presence of
an EGS with given wg and τg. The EGS aims at employing workers who are otherwise
excluded from the private labor market. A plausible way to target these workers involves
relaxing access to the EGS (τg > 0), though possibly at a lower wage.13 The utility of
private and EGS employment are respectively we − tx and wg − tx(1+τg) . There are thus
three groups of workers: those who are better oﬀ with (i) private employment, (ii) EGS
employment, and (iii) remaining outside of the workforce despite an EGS. With τg > 0
and wg ≤ we, the first group is made up of workers with the lowest search costs, since
we − tx ≥ wg −
tx
1 + τg
⇔ x ≤ (we − wg)(1 + τg)
tτg
= ˆ`e.
Workers in the third group are subject to the highest search costs, since
wg −
tx
1 + τg
≤ 0 ⇔ x ≥ wg(1 + τg)
t
= ˆ`.
In between, the EGS attracts labor supply `g = ˆ`− ˆ`e if and only if ˆ`≥ ˆ`e, or equivalently
wg(1 + τg) ≥ we. Otherwise, the EGS oﬀers too little in terms of wage and access and
aggregate labor supply facing the N employers is the same as if an EGS did not exist:
`e(we, wg, τg) = wet , with `g(we, wg, τg) = 0. In sum, the associated (kinked) inverse labor
supply schedule facing the N employers is of the form:
we(`, wg, τg) = max{wg + τgt`
1 + τg
, t`}. (2)
Since, max{wg + τgt`1+τg , t`} ≥ t`, the establishment of an EGS directly impacts labor
supply by raising the minimal wage that the N employers must oﬀer to secure positive
employment. Eﬀectively, the EGS raises the reservation wage of any worker contemplat-
ing private sector employment by exactly the amount of the EGS wage wg.
13If, in contrast τg < 0, so that tg is strictly greater than t, the EGS must oﬀer a strictly higher wage
than the N employers in order to generate positive employment. In addition, the EGS changes place
with private employers and ends up hiring low search cost workers who are employed even without an
EGS — an implication that does not appear to correspond well with the stated aims of employment
guarantee schemes, that direct competition with private employment is to be avoided.
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Likewise, an increase in the ease of access to EGS employment, τg, also raises the private
sector wage, we. Indeed, as τg → ∞, the EGS becomes a true universal guarantee of
employment:
we(`, wg, τg) = max{wg + t`, t`} = wg + t`.
On the other hand, as τg → 0, accessing EGS employment is just as costly as accessing
private employment,
we(`, wg, τg) = max{wg, t`}.
The N employers now eﬀectively operate in a perfectly contestable labor market (Bau-
mol 1982), in which labor supply is perfectly elastic at the EGS wage wg up until ` =
wg
t
.
With these two limiting cases in mind, the labor market implications of an EGS for in-
termediate values of τg should naturally be expected to be mixed, wherein the standard
employment deterring eﬀect of a reservation wage hike is interacted with the employ-
ment enhancing eﬀect of contestability. The question remains as to which one of the two
eﬀects dominate, and for what range of parameter values?
Introducing (2) into the employers’ profit maximizing problem, the intersection of the
marginal labor cost (∂w(`−i+`i,wg ,τg)`i∂`i ) schedule and the marginal value product (a), eval-
uated at a symmetric equilibrium once again gives the equilibrium private employment
and wage levels. This is shown in Figures 2 a and b. As should be apparent, if the
EGS wage and access are jointly too low, wg(1 + τg) < a(1+n) , the EGS has no impact on
private employment. At the opposite extreme, if wg > a, the EGS completely displaces
private employment. Other than these two limit cases, three possible types of nontriv-
ial equilibrium labor market outcomes {`e(n,wg, τg), we(n,wg, τg), `g(n,wg, τg)} can be
identified relative to no government intervention scenario:14
Proposition 1 I. If wg[1 + τg(1 + n)] < a ≤ wg(1 + τg)(1 + n), the EGS raises pri-
vate employment with no equilibrium EGS employment: `e =
wg(1+τg)
t
> `o(n) and
`g = 0. The private sector wage is simply we = wg(1 + τg).
II. If wg(1 + τg) < a ≤ wg[1 + τg(1 + n)], the EGS raises private employment and
hires a positive number of EGS workers: `e =
(a−wg)(1+τg)
τgt(1+n)
≥ `o(n) and `g =
wg(1 + τg)/t− `e > 0. The private sector wage is given by we = a+nwg1+n ≥ wo(n).
14The arguments of `e, `g and we are dropped whenever there is no risk of confusion in what follows.
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III. If wg ≤ a ≤ wg(1+τg), the EGS now lowers private employment, and hires a positive
number of EGS workers: `e =
(a−wg)(1+τg)
τgt(1+n)
≤ `o(n) and `g = wg(1 + τg)/t− `e > 0.
The private sector wage continues to be we =
a+nwg
1+n
≥ wo(n).
In all cases, we is higher than the EGS wage, and the no government intervention wage
wo(n).
The private sector wage eﬀect of an EGS should come as little surprise, since the intro-
duction of an EGS eﬀectively shifts the inverse labor supply schedule upwards. What
may be somewhat unexpected, however, is that an EGS can either strictly increase (I
and II), or decrease private sector employment (III). The increase in private sector em-
ployment should be attributed to contestability, wherein employers are in fact induced
to pay a higher wage, and employ more workers than when an EGS does not exist. Here,
the introduction of the EGS as an additional source of employment eﬀectively erodes the
market power embraced by each one of the N employers. With high enough levels of
wage and access (III), however, the reservation eﬀect starts to dominate and employers
respond by scaling back labor hiring.
While seemingly straightforward, these three employment regimes embody a wide array
useful observations. Our discussion in what follows touches upon three sets of compara-
tive statics results, with respect to the EGS wage, access to the EGS, and market power
exhibited by employers in the private sector.
3.2 Non-monotonicity, the EGS wage and access
Our first observation concerns non-monotonicity. At given EGS access (τg > 0) and mar-
ket power (n > 0), private employment first rises and eventually falls with successively
higher levels of wg. This is shown in Figure 3, in which schedule L
e
1 traces the non-
monotonic private labor market employment response to the EGS wage, starting from
the no government intervention baseline `o(n) =
a
[(1+n)t]
, given τg > 0 and n > 0. These
correspond to a starting phase (I) in which higher levels of wg promotes contestability
and raises `e =
wg(1+τg)
t
, followed by two subsequent phases (II and III) in which further
increases in the EGS wage trigger the reservation wage eﬀect, causing `e =
(a−wg)(1+τg)
τgt(1+n)
to bend downwards.
Taking instead the EGS wage and market power as given, a similar non-monotonic
relationship between private sector and EGS employment subsequent to improvements
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in access to the latter — in which private employment first rises (I) and then falls (II and
III) with access — can be shown using Proposition 1.
3.3 Local and Global Employment Eﬀects
With non-monotonicity, a simple demonstration that the marginal impact of an increase
in wg is a reduction in EGS employment, as is the case with types II and III outcomes,
provides insuﬃcient proof that the EGS has unambiguously lowered private employment
relative to no government intervention. In Figure 4, where τg > 0 and n > 0 are once
again exogenously given, the private employment outcome labeled ¯`e can be achieved
either by (i) exploiting the contestability eﬀect of an EGS, by setting the EGS wage at
wg1 =
t¯`e
(1+τg)
, or (ii) by raising the wage even further so that the reservation wage eﬀect
is triggered with wˆg2 = a− tτg
¯`
e(1+n)
(1+τg)
. In both cases, the same private employment level
which exceeds the no government intervention level, `o(n), is achieved. However, in (ii)
a local increase in wg always reduces private employment.
3.4 Market Power
If the labor market is perfectly competitive to begin with, it can be easily verified that
the range of productivity levels in which the EGS raises total employment with no EGS
employment collapses to a single point, wg(1 + τg). The range in which an EGS raises
total employment by raising both private and EGS employment likewise collapses to the
same point wg(1+τg). As should be expected, where there is no pre-existing labor market
distortion to begin with, the introduction of an EGS at most leaves unchanged, when
a ≥ wg(1 + τg), or otherwise strictly decreases private employment. Moving away from
competitive markets, non-monotonicity is inevitable. Figure 3 demonstrates, where Le1,
Le2 and L
e
3 constitute a family of private employment schedules with successively decreas-
ing values of n, or equivalently successively more competitive labor market structure.
4 The Desirability of an EGS
Given the wide array of possibilities in which an EGS can be adapted to impact private
and EGS employment, the nature of an optimally designed EGS will naturally depend
on the ultimate end that a scheme is expected to achieve. With employment determined
jointly by the extent of market power, private sector productivity and the cost of job
search, an EGS may be used as a means to target (i) private sector employment in or-
der to oﬀset market power, or (ii) private and EGS employment combined in order to
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lift workers out of poverty. Furthermore, an EGS may also be deployed to maximize a
social welfare function in which a planner’s concern for (iii) market eﬃciency and (iv)
income distribution are accounted for. We will examine each of these possibilities in turn.
To fulfill any of one of these objectives, we assume that a lump sum tax T (wg, τg) is
raised in order to finance the EGS. The budget requirements of an employment guarantee
involves two types of government expenditures. The first involves the wage cost of the
scheme, or simply, wg`g(n,wg, τg). The second source of expenditure covers the cost
required to reduce the cost of job search for each worker, τg. Thus,
Be(wg, τg) = wg`g(n,wg, τg) +
Z `g+`e
`e
(t− t
1 + τg
)xdx. (3)
There are a variety of other modeling options here, but as a benchmark, we assume for
the moment that the government does not enjoy any particular advantage, as compared
to workers, in managing the cost of job search.15 As a result, the reduction in the total
cost of job search due to a reduction in tg, and the budgetary requirement for doing so
is in fact one for one.16 Government budget balance requires that
T (wg, τg) = Be(wg, τg).
4.1 Private Employment Targeting
Consider here a planner with an aim to maximize private employment `e(n,wg, τg), for
any given budget Be(wg, τg) ≤ B¯(≥ 0). Equivalently, the problem of the planner is
simply:
max
wg,τg
`e(n,wg, τg), s.t. Be(wg, τg) ≤ B¯, wg ≥ w¯g.
An optimal EGS in this context is in fact straightforward. As shown in Figure 3,
for every τg ≥ 0, and n > 0, a maximal level of private employment can be reached
through
max
wg
`e(n,wg, τg) =
a(1 + τg)
t(1 + τg(1 + n))
(4)
by setting wg = a/(1 + τg(1 + n)). Now,
max
τg
a(1 + τg)
t(1 + τg(1 + n))
=
a
t
= `o(0)
15See Section 6 for an alternative way of incorporating the budget requirement of reducing the cost
of job search.
16An alternative and equivalent assumption here is that the government provides a transportation
cost subsidy to each worker that is equal to
τgtx
(1+τg)
.
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by setting τg = 0. As such, the promise to guarantee employment alone can replicate
the competitive labor market outcome. This is accomplished by an EGS wage and ac-
cess pairing: wg = a and τg = 0. Here, the EGS elicits the labor market outcome in
a perfectly contestable market, in which the government behaves as an otherwise iden-
tical employer of last resort (τg = 0), ready to pay the the competitively determined
wage a on demand. In equilibrium, this is accomplished at no cost to the government
Be(wg, τg) = 0.
Two points deserve attention here. First, if the labor market is perfectly competitive to
begin with, an EGS can of course never raise employment beyond the no government
intervention level (Section 3.4). Second, irrespective of the degree of market power,
an EGS can never raise employment beyond the competitive level, for doing so would
require employers to pay a wage higher than the productivity of labor, an impossibility
if employers are to make non-negative profits.
4.2 Aggregate Employment Targeting
As opposed to maximizing private employment by choice of an appropriate EGS wage
and access pairing, another question is how wg and τg might be chosen to achieve an
exogenous aggregate employment (EGS plus private employment) target, ¯`, with as much
of it achieved via private employment as possible. In other words, the problem of the
planner is simply:
max
wg,τg
`e(n,wg, τg), s.t. `e(n,wg, τg) + `g(n,wg, τg) = ¯`, wg ≥ w¯g. (5)
There are two cases to consider. Suppose first that `o(n) < ¯`≤ `o(0). Such an employ-
ment target can be viewed as primarily eﬃciency-improving, aimed at delivering a labor
market outcome closer to the perfectly competitive level `o(0). By adjusting wg and τg,
there exists in fact a continuous schedule of wg and τg pairings that solves the maximiza-
tion problem above.17 The most obvious one, which once again invokes contestability,
involves setting τg = 0 and wg = t¯`. Here, the planner similarly behaves as an otherwise
identical employer (τg = 0), and commits to pay a wage wg = t¯` just enough to expand
total employment to ¯` along the labor supply schedule. This is of course a special case of
Proposition 1(I), in which there is no equilibrium EGS employment, and the target ¯` is
fulfilled completely by expanding private employment over and above the no government
17In particular, any wg and τg that satisfies wg(1+ τg) = ¯`, and belong to employment outcomes type
I (wg[1 + τg(1 + n)] < a ≤ wg(1 + τg)(1 + n), so that the employment target is fulfilled completely by
prviate employment (wg(1 + τg) = t`e(n,wg, τg) = t¯`) will do the task.
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intervention level.18
The more interesting case, of course, involves an employment target higher than the
competitive level ¯`> `o(0). To this end, note that for at least ¯` number of workers to
be hired in the aggregate, it must be the case that wg − t¯`1+τg ≥ 0⇔ wg(1 + τg)− t¯`≥ 0.
Denote
w¯ ≡ wg(1 + τg) ≡ t¯` (6)
as the wage equivalent of the EGS aggregate employment target. Intuitively, this is
the wage that an EGS must oﬀer in order for ¯` workers to be employed jointly by the
private sector and the EGS, if access were to remain at the level of the private sector
τg = 0. With this definition, an EGS that generates more than the competitive level of
employment in the aggregate must also provide a wage equivalent wg(1 + τg) = w¯ that
exceeds the competitive wage, since
t¯`> t`o(0)⇔ w¯ > t
a
t
= a.
As may be expected, an EGS that oﬀers a wage equivalent higher than the competitive
wage, or the marginal value product of labor, can adversely impact private employment.
In fact, a more precise statement can be had by simply applying the definition of the
employment target ¯`= wg(1+τg)
t
to Proposition 1:
Proposition 2 I. If `o(n) ≤ ¯`< `o(0)/(1 + nτg/(1 + τg)), an EGS raises private em-
ployment with no equilibrium EGS employment: `e = ¯`> `o(n) and `g = 0. The
private sector wage is simply the EGS wage equivalent we = w¯.
II. If `o(0)/(1+ nτg/(1 + τg)) ≤ ¯`< `o(0), an EGS raises private employment and hires
a positive number of EGS workers: `e =
(a−wg)¯`
(t¯`−wg)(1+n) ≥ `o(n) and `g = ¯`− `e > 0.
The private sector wage is given by we =
a+nwg
1+n
≥ wo(n).
III. If `o(0) ≤ ¯`< `o(0)(1 + τg), an EGS now lowers private employment, and hires a
positive number of EGS workers: `e =
(a−wg)¯`
(t¯`−wg)(1+n) ≥ `o(n) and `g = ¯`− `e > 0.
The private sector wage continues to be we =
a+nwg
1+n
≥ wo(n).
This provides an exact demarcation, and shows that the reservation wage (private em-
ployment reducing) eﬀect of an EGS takes on a dominating role whenever the EGS
18To see this, note that with τg = 0 and wg = t¯`, the relevant range of Type I employment can be
simplified as t¯` < a ≤ t¯`(1 + n). By definition of `o(n) and `o(0), this corresponds exactly with the
feasible range of aggregate employment target `o(n) < ¯`≤ `o(0) under consideration here.
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aggregate employment target exceeds the competitive employment level (III). Interest-
ingly, Proposition 2 shows that such an EGS necessarily leads to a reduction in private
sector employment. Thus, the double-edged EGS in fact comes with a built-in constraint
— an EGS that raises total employment beyond the competitive level can never simulta-
neously raise private employment beyond the no government intervention level.
Also by virtue of Proposition 2(III), observe that given `o(0) < ¯`, EGS employment
¯`− `e strictly rises with the EGS wage. In other words, in order to minimize EGS
employment (displacement of private employment) given the target ¯`, wg should be set
as low as possible. Implicitly, this requires that access τg be accordingly relaxed in order
to sustain the same aggregate employment target, ¯`= wg(1+τg). In sum, the EGS wage
and access pairing {w∗g(n, ¯`), τ ∗g (n, ¯`)} that minimizes private employment displacement
depends critically on the size of the employment target ¯`:
Proposition 3 For aggregate employment targets satisfying `o(n) < ¯` ≤ `o(0), pri-
vate employment can be maximzed to match ¯` exactly with w∗g(n, ¯`) = t¯`, and
1 + τ ∗g (n, ¯`) = 1. The associated EGS employment is equal to zero.
For aggregate employment targets satisfying ¯`> `o(0), w
∗
g(n,
¯`) = w¯g, and 1 + τ ∗g (n, ¯`) =
t¯`
w¯g
. The associated private employment is no greater than the no government inter-
vention level.
There is thus a tight link between the ultimate objective of the EGS employment tar-
get and the EGS wage depending on whether the objective is to improve eﬃciency
(`o(n) < ¯`≤ `o(0)), or to combat poverty left unchecked by market forces (¯`> `o(0)).
Interestingly, the relationship between such an EGS wage and the employment target is
discontinuous — to be set suﬃciently high to elicit contestability if eﬃciency improvement
is the only objective of the EGS, or as low as possible if unemployment associated with
perfect competition is deemed too high. In both cases, access is adjusted accordingly to
meet the target. What remains to be determined, therefore, is the important question
of the optimal choice of employment target.
5 Eﬃciency, Contestability and Credibility
We now turn to a more general social welfare function, W (wg, τg), made up of two parts.
The first part comprises of the sum of the (i) profits of the N employers ((a−we)`e), (ii)
revenue generated from the EGS (ag`g) and (iii) utility of all workers (
R `e
0 (we − tx)dx+R `e+`g
`e
(wg − tx(1+τg))dx). The second part is a lump sum tax T (wg, τg), raised in order to
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finance the EGS (Section 4).
The social welfare function is thus
W (wg, τg) = (a− we)`e + ag`g +
Z `e
0
(we − tx)dx+
Z `e+`g
`e
(wg −
tx
1 + τg
)dx− T (wg, τg).
By definition of the government budget constraint T (wg, τg) = Be(wg, τg) and substitut-
ing for Be(wg, τg) from equation (4), the social welfare function above simplifies to
W (wg, τg) = a`e + ag`g −
t
2
(`e + `g)
2
= [(a− ag)`e] +
"
ag −
t¯`
2
#
¯`. (7)
The first term in square brackets spells out the welfare cost associated with the dis-
placement of private employment, as a > ag. The second term in square bracket shows
the average net welfare gains associated with expanding employment in the economy.
Here, the revenue equivalent of EGS employment ag, and the cost of job search of each
employed workers determine the extent of this potential gain in welfare. A change of
variables yield W (wg, τg) in terms only of the employment target ¯` and wg:
W (wg, t¯`/wg − 1) = [(a− ag)`e(n,wg, t¯`/wg − 1)] +
"
ag −
t¯`
2
#
¯`.
Evidently, the task of social welfare maximization reduces down to simply the choice
of an employment target ¯`, and simultaneously an EGS wage that maximizes private
employment, conditional on the target — an exercise that has already been examined
in section 4. What the planner’s problem here additionally illuminates, as should be
evident, is the question of how high the employment target should be.
5.1 Commiting to a Complete Contract
Consider an employment guarantee legislation in which a planner commits to a wage and
access pairing, wcg and τ
c
g , to maximize the social welfare function W (wg, τg). Denote
¯`c = wcg(1 + τ
c
g )/t as the associated employment target. From (7), and the definition
of the EGS employment minimizing wage and access pairing w∗g(n, ¯`) and τ
∗
g (n,
¯`), it is
clear that
W (wg, τg) ≤W (w∗g(n, ¯`), τ ∗g (n, ¯`))
since ag − a < 0. In addition, whenever ¯` is less than the competitive employment level
(`o(0) = a/t), social welfare is monotonically increasing in ¯`, since `g(n,w
∗
g(n,
¯`), τ ∗g (n, ¯`)) =
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0, with w∗g(n, ¯`) = t¯` and τ
∗
g (n,
¯`) = 0 (Proposition 3). As soon as ¯` exceeds `o(0),
however, W (w∗g(n, ¯`), τ
∗
g (n,
¯`)) is monotonically decreasing in ¯` since EGS employment
strictly rises with the aggregate employment target (Proposition 2). We have
Proposition 4 For a planner that exercises commitment to both wg and τg, social wel-
fare is maximzed by setting the aggregate employment target at the competitive level
`o(0)(= a/t). In addition, w
c
g = a, and 1 + τ
c
g = 1, and the target
¯`c is fully met by
expanding private sector employment.
Proposition 4 shows that the optimal EGS wage is invariant across a wide variety of
parameter values of ag and market power. In particular, so long as the gap between
private and EGS productivity is positive, the optimal EGS wage is to be set high enough
to elicit contestability in the labor market.
In addition, a strictly social welfare improving EGS can always be found so long as the
labor market is imperfectly competitive. Indeed, even if the revenue derived from gen-
erating EGS employment is strictly negative (ag < 0), the proposition still calls for the
government to invoke to the fullest extent possible the contestability component of the
EGS.
Finally, since the planner’s objective espouses only eﬃciency concerns, there is simply no
reason why the aggregate employment target should exceed the competitive level, as long
as the EGS wage is optimally set. Equivalently, in no case should the government insti-
tute an EGS that hires strictly positive number of EGS workers in equilbrium, for the
competitive labor market outcome can always be replicated, at no cost to the government.
These findings are provocative particularly since they imply that whenever employers en-
joy market power, an EGS can be an extremely cost eﬀective way of raising employment,
regardless of the productivity of private and EGS employment. At least at first sight,
one can accordingly infer that even in labor markets of the highly skilled, government
provision of EGS has an important role to play. This may seem counter-intuitive, and
run contrary to the historical circumstances under which an EGS has been invoked in
times of massive unemployment and adverse productivity shocks.
In what follows, we accordingly contrast what a complete employment guarantee contract
can do in principle as shown above, with what an incomplete contract can hope to
accomplish more realistically. We do so by relaxing the assumption that the contract
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pins down both wg and τg ex ante, and by examining a set of credibility triggers that
ultimately justifies the use of an EGS.
5.2 Discretion and Incomplete Contracts
We assume that from announcement to execution of the EGS, the following sequence of
events unfolds:
• the government announces a wage wdg to be paid to workers employed under the
EGS,
• employers and workers form expectations E ¯` about the ex post EGS aggregate
employment target of the planner, and the corresponding ease of access to the
EGS, Eτg,
• conditional on E ¯` and Eτg private employment contracts are signed for E`e =
`e(n,w
d
g , Eτg) number of workers,
• having observed E`e, the government adjusts the ex post target ¯`d and access
τ dg . By doing so, the government implicitly rations / encourages access to EGS
employment, available to any worker at wage wdg .
We assume in addition that workers and employers harbor rational expectations. In
contrast to the case with commitment, the government in this case is faced with the task
of setting an EGS wage wdg ≥ w¯g, with the full knowledge that private employers and
workers can take this wage as a signal of the ex-post accessibility of the EGS.
Beginning with the final stage of the sequence. Let private employment E`e conditional
on expectation Eτg be given. An ex post social welfare maximizing aggregate employ-
ment target ¯`d can be achieved by relaxing access τ dg (w
d
g ,
¯`d) to ensure that the marginal
worker x = ¯`d is just indiﬀerent between employment as an EGS worker, and receiving
his reservation utility:
wdg −
t ¯`d
1 + τ dg (wdg , ¯`d)
= 0, or 1 + τ dg (w
d
g ,
¯`d) =
t ¯`d
wdg
, (8)
given the announced EGS wage. Note that τ dg is to be distinguished from Eτg in that
the former is the accessibility of EGS employment, to be chosen by the government
conditional on the expectation Eτg, and the announced EGS wage wdg . Put another way,
ex post discretionary limits on access (decreasing τ dg ) works as a rationing device, and
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puts checks on total employment ¯`d. The corresponding level of EGS employment is
thus `dg = max{ ¯`d − E`e, 0}. We are now in a position to examine the planner’s ex post
problem, in which an ex post employment target ¯`d is chosen to maximize the social
welfare function (7), taking E`e as given:
max
¯`d
(a− ag)E`e + (ag −
t ¯`d
2
) ¯`d. (9)
Since E`e is ex-ante given, ex post social welfare maximization no longer needs to inter-
nalize any private sector employment impact of the EGS. Hence:
Proposition 5 Given wdg ≥ w¯g and E`e ≥ 0, ex post welfare maximization implies:
¯`d =
ag
t
, `dg = max{
ag
t
− E`e, 0},
where ex post EGS employment is increasing in ag and decreasing in E`e. The implied
ex post welfare maximizing access to EGS employment τ dg (w
d
g ,
¯`d) is strictly decreasing in
wdg , with
1 + τ dg (w
d
g ,
¯`d) =
ag
wdg
. (10)
Intuitively, once employment contracts are signed and total private employment given,
the government weighs the marginal benefits ag of EGS employment relative to the
marginal cost t ¯`d. Ex post accessibility is thus increasing in the productivity of EGS
employment ag. Meanwhile, since the pool of available EGS workers (w
d
g(1+τ
d
g )/t−E`e)
is higher the higher the wage wdg (equation (8)), ex post accessibility is inversely related
to the wage wdg set forth ex-ante.
As shown in section Proposition 2, an EGS produces non-trivial labor market conse-
quences only if the aggregate employment target ¯`d is greater than the no government
intervention level, `o(n) =
a
(1+n)t
. We now know from Proposition 5 that this requires in
eﬀect
ag >
a
1 + n
. (11)
Thus, two sets of factors are simultaneously in play in determining the credibility of
an EGS. These credibility triggers include labor market triggers such as low labor pro-
ductivity and oligopsonistic market power; and cost triggers such as the revenue (costs)
that can be generated from public works. With discretion, the ex post optimal aggregate
employment target ag/t can never be greater than the competitive employment level a/t,
whenever ag < a. Furthermore, if ag is additionally lower than a/(1 + n), the aggregate
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employment target that applies in a rational expectation equilibrium is so low that an
EGS completely loses its ability to impact both private and EGS employment levels ex
post.
5.3 Getting the Wage Right
Our next task concerns the government’s choice of a wage level wdg , which maximizes
government welfare in the face of rational expectations. The answer, as it turns out, is
surprisingly simple. Since the ex-post optimal aggregate employment target ¯`d is given
by ag/t, employers and workers rationally expect that
E ¯`=
ag
t
, 1 + Eτg = 1 + τ dg (w
d
g ,
¯`d) =
t¯`d
wdg
. (12)
Making use of (7) again, the planner’s ex-ante problem is
max
wdg
[(a− ag)`e(n,wdg , τ dg (wdg , ¯`d)] +
"
ag −
t¯`d
2
#
¯`d, wdg ≥ w¯g.
Equivalently, the task involves once again the maximization of private employment `e,
given the ex-post optimal aggregate employment target ¯`d = ag/t, and rational expecta-
tions of employers and workers in (12). By direct application of Propositions 2 and 3,
we have
Proposition 6 With ex post discretion on access, there are two cases:
I. If ag <
a
(1+n)
, the optimal EGS wage is indeterminate, as the ex post optimal em-
ployment target is strictly less than the no government intervention level. The
announcement of any wdg invokes a corresponding adjustment in expectations which
determines private employment at the no government intervention level `o(n) =
a
[t(1+n)]
. In equilibrium, `g = 0.
II. If ag ∈ [ a(1+n) , a), the ex post optimal employment target lies between the no gov-
ernment intervention and the perfectly competitive employment levels. The an-
nouncement of an EGS wage wdg = ag maximizes social welfare by invoking rational
expectations, 1 + Eτg = 1. In equilibrium, private employment coincides with the
employment target ¯`d = ag
t
, and `g = 0.
Proposition 6 highlights the importance of the productivity of public workers and market
power in the design of a social welfare maximizing EGS when access cannot be commit-
ted to ex-ante. First, for public works that are suﬃciently unproductive, ag < a(1+n) ,
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the annoucement of any EGS wage inevitably lacks credibility. In a rational expectation
equilibrium, private employment and wage levels are unaﬀected, and the universal ap-
plicability of an EGS in raising private employment levels as shown in Proposition 5 is
completely lost.
With respect to market power, note that if perfect competition prevails and n = 0, there
is no case for an EGS since the range [ a
(1+n)
, a) reduces to a single point a > ag. Thus,
we have yet to uncover a single instance wherein a social welfare maximizing EGS hires
a strictly positive number of EGS workers. We turn to this question in the next section.
6 Distributional Concern
Much of the focus in the literature on employment guarantees has to do with income
distribution concerns within a competitive labor market framework, and with credible
policy commitment. The basic framework is one where a competitive labor market never-
theless leaves some individuals at low levels of income both inside and outside the labor
market. The introduction of an employment guarantee scheme under the assumption
that government announcements on the parameters (wage and access) are credible, is
now justified in terms of raising the income of those who are currently below a poverty
line. In what follows, we add distributional concerns to the eﬃciency considerations
embodied in the social welfare function discussed in the previous section, in a setting
where credibility is also an issue.
We adopt a very simple formulation of distributional concern — the government cares
about the number of workers whose income is below the exogenously given poverty line
wp. Thus, the EGS income thresshold w¯g is now set at the poverty line wp. The weight
given to this concern relative to eﬃciency is γ:
Ω(wg, τg) = (a− we)`e + ag`g +
Z `e
0
(we − tx)dx+
Z `e+`g
`e
(wg −
tx
1 + τg
)dx− T (wg, τg)
−γH
where H is simply the poverty headcount ratio (Foster, Greer and Thorbecke 1984) or
the percentage of workers below a poverty line, wp. Thus, H = 1− `e − `g. Making use
of the government budget constraint, Ω(wg, τg), the social welfare function above once
again simplifies to
Ω(wg, τg) = [(a− ag)`e] +
"
ag + γ −
t¯`
2
#
¯`− γ.
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The first term in square brackets as before spells out the welfare cost associated with
the displacement of private employment, as a > ag. The second term in square bracket
incorporates the government’s distributional concern γ as an additional source of social
welfare gains upon an expansion of employment. With this social welfare function, it can
be shown by simple extension of the arguments in Section 5.1, that with full commitment:
Proposition 7 For a planner that exercises commitment to both wg and τg, and a social
welfare function augmented with distributional concern, there exists a critical level γc,
with
γc > (a− ag)
Ã
1 +
wp
(a− wp)(1 + n)
!
> a− ag ⇔ ag + γˆc > a
such that if and only if γ ≤ γc, the aggregate employment target is set at the competitive
level `o(0)(= a/t), with no equilibrium EGS employment: ¯`
c = `o(0), w
c
g = a, and 1 +
τ cg = 1. Otheriwise, with γ > γ
c, employment target ¯`c exceeds the perfectly competitively
baseline, and implicitly solves:
¯`c =
ag + γ
t
− (a− ag)(a− wp)wp
(t¯`c − wp)2(1 + n)
> `o(0).
In addition, wcg = wp, and 1+ τ
c
g = t(
¯`c/wp). There is strictly positive EGS employment,
and private employment is strictly less than the no government intervention baseline
`o(n).
Proof: Appendix.
The second part of the proposition shows that productive EGS employment and dis-
tributional concern go hand in hand in determining the welfare maximizing wage and
accessibility of EGS employment. In order to justify strictly positive EGS employment
in equilibrium, and hence at least some displacement of private sector workers, it must
be the case that ag + γ strictly exceeds the productivity of private employment a. How-
ever, in order to accommodate such a high aggregate employment target, displacement
of private employment is inevitable (Proposition 2).
In addition, with the discretion and incomplete contracts framework of Section 6, it can
be shown that:
Proposition 8 Given wdg ≥ wp and E`e ≥ 0, ex post maximization of the social welfare
function augmented with distribution concern implies an aggregate employment target
and an EGS employment level:
¯`d =
ag + γ
t
, `dg = max{
ag + γ
t
− E`e, 0},
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where actual EGS employment is increasing in ag and decreasing in E`e. The implied
ex post welfare maximizing access to EGS employment τ dg (w
d
g ,
¯`d) is strictly decreasing in
wdg , with
1 + τ dg (w
d
g ,
¯`d) =
ag + γ
wdg
. (13)
For a planner exhibiting distributional concern, the marginal benefits of EGS employment
ex post should be revised to read ag + γ. Ex post accessibility is thus increasing the
weight attached to distributional concern γ. Since an EGS produces non-trivial labor
market consequences only if the aggregate employment target ¯`d is greater than the no
government intervention benchmark, we require
ag + γ >
a
1 + n
. (14)
In other words, the weight attached to distributional concern now serves as an additional
credibility trigger. Even more importantly, since the ex-post optimal aggregate employ-
ment target is no less than (ag+γ)
t
as shown in the proposition, a planner who cares
suﬃciently about distribution may well credibly apply an ex-post employment target
that strictly exceeds the competitive employment level. Indeed,
Proposition 9 With ex post discretion on access, and a social welfare function aug-
mented with a concern for distribution, there are three cases:
I. If ag + γ < a(1+n) , the optimal EGS wage is indeterminate, as the ex post optimal
employment target is strictly less than the no government intervention level. The
announcement of any wdg invokes a corresponding adjustment in expectations, which
then jointly implies private employment at the no government intervention level
`o(n) = a/[t(1 + n)]. In equilibrium, `g = 0.
II. If ag + γ > a, the ex post optimal employment target exceeds the perfectly competitive
level, ¯`d = ag+γ
t
> `o(0) = a/t. To minimize private sector employment displace-
ment / EGS employment, the optimal EGS wage should be set at the poverty line.
In equilibrium, access is adjusted to accommodate `g > 0 and `e < `o(n).
III. If ag + γ ∈ [ a(1+n) , a), the ex post optimal employment target lies between the no
government intervention and the perfectly competitive employment levels. The an-
nouncement of an EGS wage wdg = ag + γ maximizes social welfare, by invoking
the rational expectation 1 + Eτg = 1, and an ex post aggregate employment target
(ag+γ)
t
greater than `o(n) =
a
[t(1+n)]
. In equilibrium, `g = 0.
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Figure 4 summarizes these results in {a, ag + γ} space, and emphasizes the intricate
balance between the (i) welfare maximizing EGS wage, (ii) private and public sector la-
bor productivity, (iii) the degree of imperfect competition in the labor market, and (iv)
weight attached to distributional concern. For credibility triggers that justify interme-
diate levels of aggregate employment targeting between the no government intervention
and the perfectly competitive baselines, an EGS works purely as an announcement of
contestability. Thus, we have an intriguing instance here where the eﬀectiveness of the
announcement of EGS in eﬀecting eﬃciency enhancing change in the labor market now
depends critically on the distributional concern of the planner in question. Of course,
the relevance of this announcement eﬀect depends on whether the labor market is im-
perfectly competitive to begin with (equivalently, if the range [a/(1+n), a] is nonempty).
Comparing an EGS with commitment (Proposition 7) and an EGS with discretion
(Proposition 9), two points are evident. For planners exhibiting relatively low levels
of concern for distribution, the cost of policy discretion comes in the form of an inability
to elicit eﬃciency improving labor market reforms. In particular, the credibility of an
EGS to improve eﬃciency is now questionable in labor markets with high private sector
productivity (if the inequality ag + γ > a/(1 + n) if violated).
At the opposite extreme, for planners exhibiting relatively high levels of distributional
concern, the cost of policy discretion now comes in the form of an inability to design a
wage and access combination into an EGS that displaces private sector employment the
least. Thus, for given private sector productivity, a higher degree of poverty aversion
also entails a higher level of private employment displacement. For example, for γ in
the range (a − ag, γc), an EGS with commitment can only be justified on the grounds
of eﬃciency improvement (Proposition 7), and should never lead to displacement of
private employment. With ex-post discretion, however, the same planner sets the EGS
wage at the poverty line, implying strictly positive displacement of private employment
(Proposition 9).
7 Concluding Remarks and Extensions
This paper has taken the first step towards understanding the labor market implications
of an EGS, and the role of employment policy legislations when the ex-post credibility
of an EGS may be in doubt. While we have shown that the eﬀectiveness of an EGS
depends critically on the feasibility of commitment, and whether the credibility triggers
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apply in the case of discretion, there remains a host of other important factors that
warrants future research. Here, we briefly touch upon two simple extensions of the basic
model.
7.1 Managing the Cost of Job Search:
We have so far assumed a neutral scenario wherein the government enjoys no particular
advantage over workers in managing the cost of job search. In a variety of useful contexts,
the government may well be in a better position to overcome the costs associated with job
search and employment. Examples of such potential cost savings include the provision of
child care for female workers, as well as job training and skill upgrading to be provided
publicly as a part of the EGS. Of course, the converse may just as well be true, if, for
example, the marginal cost of public finance is large enough. Each of these possibilities
impacts the ex post budget cost of an EGS. Let λg be the marginal cost of public funds,
and λt denote any advantages that the government enjoys in lowering the cost of job
search and employment. The budget requirement of the EGS is thus:
Be(n,wg, τg) = (1 + λg)wg`g(n,wg, τg) + (1 + λg − λt)
Z `g+`e
`e
(t− t
1 + τg
)xdx.
Incorporating this into the government’s welfare function at once yields an additional set
of useful findings. For example, if λg < λt and the marginal cost of public funds is not
too high, it can be readily shown an ex post welfare optimal employment target is all the
more likely to exceed the no government intervention private employment benchmark.
Of course, a suﬃciently high marginal cost of public funds λg has the exactly opposite
eﬀect, and serves only to oﬀset the credibility of an employment guarantee, however
much a government may embrace distributional concern.
7.2 More General Loss Functions
In place of the poverty head count, suppose instead that the loss function is distribu-
tionally sensitive. In particular, let the loss function be given by
γ
Ã
(1− wg
wp
)`g + (1− `e − `g)
!
where wp is the predetermined poverty line. This is a special case of the Foster, Greer
and Thorbecke family of poverty measures, and privately employed workers are assumed
to enjoy wage income greater than the poverty line. With this single deviation from our
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basic model, it can be verified that the ex post welfare maximizing and discretionary τg,
is once again systematically related to the ex ante legislated EGS wage, with
¯`d =
ag
t
+ γ
wdg
twp
, `dg = max{
ag
t
+ γ
wdg
twp
− E`e, 0} and 1 + τ dg (wdg , ¯`d) =
t ¯`d
wdg
,
where ag +
γwdg
twp
replaces ag + γ in Proposition 8, and represents the ex-post marginal
welfare gains of hiring one more worker under the EGS. By inspection, an exogenous
increase in the EGS wage once again leads to the expectation that access τ dg (w
d
g ,
¯`d)
will be limited ex post. Incorporating this revised welfare loss associated with poverty
aversion into the government welfare function,19 it is easy to see that setting the EGS
wage at less than the poverty line only strengthens the adverse welfare impact of private
employment displacement, as the marginal poverty impact of raising private employment
is strictly greater than raising EGS employment, or γ > γw
d
g
wp
. While beyond the scope
of this paper, the exact manner in which distributionally sensitive loss functions may be
expected to impact the labor market influence of an EGS an important question that
warrants further attention.
19Government welfare now reads:
Ω(wg, τg) = [(a− ag + γ(1−
wg
wp
))`e +
∙
ag + γ
wg
wp
− t
¯`
2
¸
¯`− γ.
whenever wg is less than the poverty line, or whenever 1 >
wg
wp
. By inspection, the marginal welfare
impact of a reduction in `e ((a − ag + γ(1 − wgwp )) is strictly larger than when a poverty head count is
employed (a− ag).
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 7: We begin with two observations: the government objective
function (i) is piece-wise continuously diﬀerentiable in ¯` and (ii) exhibits a discrete jump
exactly at ¯`= `o(0) = a/t, the competitive baseline. To complete the proof, we show that
for an employment target greater than the competitive baseline to be a global maximum,
the poverty aversion parameter γ must be suﬃciently larger than γc as displayed in the
Proposition.
For (i), we note from Proposition 2 that three cases can be identified. For ¯`< `o(n),
the no government intervention baseline, an EGS has no impact on welfare as private
employment is unaﬀected and no worker opts for EGS employment. Thus,
Ω(wg, τg)|1+τg=t¯`/wg = Ω¯o = (a+ γ − a/2(1 + n))a/(t(1 + n)).
For ¯`∈ [`o(n), `o(0)], `e(n,wg, (t¯`/wg) − 1) ≤ `e(n,w∗g(¯`), τ ∗g (¯`)) = ¯`. It follows that for
¯`≤ `o(0),
Ω(wg, τg)|1+τg=t¯`/wg = [(a− ag)`e(n,wg, t¯`/wg − 1)] +
"
ag + γ −
t¯`
2
#
¯`− γ
≤ Ω(w∗g(n, ¯`), τ ∗g (n, ¯`))
= (a+ γ − t
¯`
2
)¯`− γ ≡ Ω¯1(¯`).
Thus, government welfare is increasing (strictly increasing) in ¯` for ` < a/t, and γ ≥
(>)0. In addition, max¯`Ω¯1(¯`) = (a/2 + γ)a/t − γ by setting the employment target
¯`c
1 = a/t at the competitive level. For
¯` > `o(0), w
∗
g(
¯`) = wp. Thus, `e(n,wg, t¯`) ≤
`e(n,w
∗
g(
¯`), τ ∗g (¯`)) = (a− wp)(¯`)/[(t¯`− wp)(1 + n)] < ¯`. It follows that,
Ω(wg, τg)|1+τg=t¯`/wg ≤ Ω(wp, τg)|1+τg=t¯`/wp
=
(a− ag)(a− wp)¯`
(t¯`− wp)(1 + n)
+ (ag + γ −
t¯`
2
)¯`− γ ≡ Ω¯2(¯`).
It can be readily verified that Ω¯2(¯`) is strictly concave in ¯` for ¯`> a/t. Part (ii) of our
argument now follows straightforwardly, since
Ω¯2(`o(0)) =
µ
a− ag
1 + n
+ ag + γ −
a
2
¶
a
t
− γ
< Ω¯1(`o(0)) = (
a
2
+ γ)
a
t
− γ. (15)
Thus, the solution to argmax¯`Ω¯2(¯`) = ¯`c2(γ) characterizes a local maximum. In particu-
lar, ¯`c2(γ) is a corner solution, at the competitive baseline `o(0) if and only if
∂Ω¯2(¯`)
∂ ¯` |¯`=`o(0) ≤
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0, or
γ ≤ γˆ ≡ (a− ag)
Ã
1 +
wp
(a− wp)(1 + n)
!
.
For γ > γˆ, ¯`c2(γ) implicitly solves
∂Ω¯2(¯`)
∂ ¯` = 0, or
¯`c
2 =
ag + γ
t
− (a− ag)(a− wp)wp
(t¯`c − wp)2(1 + n)
> `o(0). (16)
Since the right hand side of (15) is strictly increasing in γ, the locally maximum employ-
ment target ¯`c2(γ) is likewise strictly increasing in γ, whenever γ > γˆ.
Finally, to confirm that ¯`c2 characterizes a global maximum, we require in addition
that
Ω¯1(¯`c1) = Ω¯1(`o(0)) ≤ Ω¯2(¯`c2).
To this end, note from (15) that
Ω¯1(¯`c1) > Ω¯2(¯`
c
1) (17)
for any γ ≥ 0 and hence, for any γ ≥ γˆ. In addition, by the envelope theorem,
∂[Ω¯1(¯`c1, γ)− Ω¯2(¯`c1, γ)]
∂γ
= ¯`c1 − ¯`c2 = `o(0)− ¯`c2 < 0,
and thus the diﬀerence Ω¯1(¯`c1, γ) − Ω¯2(¯`c1, γ) is monotonically decreasing in γ. By the
intermediate value theorem, there exists γc > γˆ such that Ω¯1(¯`c1, γ) − Ω¯2(¯`c1, γ) < 0
whenever γ > γc. The global maximum of the government maximization problem ¯`c =
¯`c
2 > `o(0). Otherwise,
¯`c is set at the competitive baseline, ¯`c1.
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